Natalist Antinatalism

Disclaimer: I am a philosophy noob, economics noob, environmental science noob and I’d be glad to be corrected wherever I’m wrong.

  • (1) If Earth Overshoot Day isn’t a publicity stunt after all, it might have dramatic consequences for effective altruists. Even if the date (which conspicuously is always an exact date instead of a range, given the uncertainty and seeming intractability of the problem) they claim every year is exaggerated, the possibility of wrecking our planet faster than it can heal warrants an intelligent inquiry, particularly because of the eventuality it entails.
  • (2) The creation of life is generally assigned positive value. I believe the creation of life has high positive value and death has high negative value, not necessarily exactly canceling out.

Is there a point beyond which we should consider collectively slowing down population growth or even decrease the population despite the ‘inherent’ value in creating life? A reasonable tipping point seems to be when the marginal value of creating one more life is exactly canceled out by the inconveniences caused to the rest of the world. One could envisage a starving planet, where every new birth engenders more starvation and suffering – an unlikely scenario where (classical ?) utilitarianism would advise against creating more lives.

  • (3) In a recent post, 80000 hours and Toby Ord discuss that ‘the welfare of future generations should be our number one moral concern’ as only a small fraction of all the people whose well-being we care about are alive today.
  • (4) In Altruism and Profit, Paul Christiano says:

If you complete a high-impact technology project which other technologists would have tackled in a year, the counterfactual doesn’t just involve that project finishing a year sooner—it also involves those technologists going off to do whatever else they would have done.

I argue the net benefit should also include the effects of cascading subsequent discoveries by -1 years. If the discovery improves the quality of everyone’s life by a factor of 1.000001, it doesn’t just ‘save’ 0.000001 * 7 billion QALYs, the counterfactual must also involve the preponement and acceleration of subsequent discoveries that might slightly improve the quality for an extremely large number of generations (In other words, it should have a high multiplier).

Any analysis of the benefit of an outcome must also take into account the impact it has on the (hopefully countless) future generations. The marginal value of giving birth to one more child must also include the impact on all future generations.

The marginal benefit of producing one more child must at least offset the cost of depriving future generations of the resources it consumes. Let it sink in, (if) we are consuming more than we can replenish, (then) with the birth of every new child Earth Overshoot Day is getting closer to January 1. Pause and ponder over the possibility of starving (or maybe just depriving) countless future generations, and the expected impact of averting it. The world needn’t be starving already for the expected value of creating human life to be negative, increasing the likelihood of starving future generations counts as well.

If Earth Overshoot Day is for real, natalism calls for antinatalism.